ABSTRACT This paper presents generic structural cryptanalysis against type-I generalized Feistel networks (GFN), in which all the inner transformations are unknown. The target of our attack is to retrieve all the unknown round functions. We provide an improved yoyo game distinguisher, in which one rejects a large group of start guesses by a single wrong guess, hence is quite advantageous for reducing the complexity. Next, we exploit this distinguisher to develop a recovery attack of such structure and find the look-up tables of the first, eighth, and ninth round functions. Then by the encryption and decryption similarity, we recover the LUTs of the second, third, and tenth round functions from the decrypt direction. Finally, we retrieve the rest rounds by using the analytic relationships between the plaintexts and their four-round encryption results. Our complete recovery requires time complexity O(2 3.36n ) and memory O(2 n ), where n is the branch size. For 64-bit block cipher, our result will approximate a real-life attack. This paper is the first recovery attack against ten-round type-I GFN.
I. INTRODUCTION
The architecture is one of the most important components in block cipher design. Once the architecture of a block cipher is chosen, it will affect essentials such as the round number, the hardware cost and the data processing speed. At present, typical architectures include the Feistel network, Substitution-Permutation network, Lai-Massey scheme and also, the generalized Feistel networks (GFN for short). The GFN architectures have the advantage of sharing similar encryption and decryption structures and thus allow economical implementations on hardware. There are several types of GFN known in literature [15] , [22] . For example, type-I, type-II, type-III, Nyberg's GFN, etc., are known to us. In this paper, we deal with the type-I GFN, which is used in CAST-256 [1] (known as AES candidate) and Lesamnta [11] (known as SHA-3 candidate).
General research on block cipher architecture mainly includes the pseudo-randomness property [13] , [14] , differential/ linear property [15] , [19] , [20] and impossible differential property [12] . In this work, we consider the security of type-I GFNs from the viewpoint of structural attack (also referred to as recovery attack). Unlike traditional
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key-recovery cryptanalysis, in this cryptanalysis, all of the inner functions are unknown, the information available to the attacker include:
1. the general architecture of the block cipher; 2. the size of the cipher/internal functions; 3. the encryption/decryption oracle of the block cipher. The aim of the attack is to recover all the secret functions. Notice that this attack cannot take advantage of concrete cryptographic properties of the secret inner functions, therefore, structural attacks are often weaker than traditional attacks on given block ciphers. However, once this attack works for one single block cipher, it will be applicable to large categories of block ciphers even the inner components are replaced. By this mean, this attack is very useful in establishing confidence for the architecture itself.
Related Works. The security estimation of a block cipher with secret components is far from being new. The research results on structural attack mainly include SPN structures and Feistel structures.
In [3] , Biryukov and Shamir applied integral cryptanalysis to recover the inner layers of a special SPN structure named SASAS, which consists of three substitution layers (denoted by S) interleaved with two affine layers (denoted by A). In [8] , the decomposition of ASASA was first considered by Biryukov et [2] , was used to decompose FN up to 7-round [4] . Later in [18] , the yoyo trick was applied in AES, and a 6-round key-independent distinguisher of AES was proposed for the first time.
Since decomposing an SPN/FN architecture into their components is possible for this moment, a natural question is, can we find ways to decompose more structures? i.e. some special generalized Feistel networks. Therefore, this work follows the research line of structural attacks, and targets GFN specifically.
Our Contributions. This paper mainly concentrates on the recovery attacks against type-I GFN. The main results of this paper are as follows: 1) We revisit the yoyo game and present truncated differential properties of 10-round type-I GFN, which could be treated as the foundation of our yoyo game. Starting from these properties, we provide the improved yoyo game property. 2) We propose an improved yoyo game attack against this structure. In this improved game, one rejects a large group of start guesses by one single wrong guess, which will greatly help in reducing the complexity. We then use this attack to recover the outermost 6 rounds, i.e. F 1 , F 2 , F 3 , F 8 , F 9 and F 10 . Similar to the attack proposed by [4] , our attack does not make any assumptions about whether the round functions are bijective or not. 3) Finally, we use the analytic relationships between the plaintexts and their 4-round encryption results to get the rest round functions of this architecture. On the whole, our complete recovery requires time complexity O(2 3.36n ) and memory O(2 n ), where n is the branch size. For 64-bit block cipher, our result approximates a practical attack.
Paper Organization. Section 2 introduces some basic notations and definitions. Section 3 provides the yoyo game property of 10-round type-I GFN. Section 4 focuses on improving the yoyo game and decomposing the outer-most round functions by using the yoyo game property. Section 5 deals with the rest rounds of type-I GFNs. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
The following symbols are used in this paper.
⊕ the bit-wise XOR operation; n the width of one branch in GFN; E, D the encryption (decryption, resp.) function of the target GFN;
the cardinal number of set •; 
Type-I GFN
Let (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 ) be the input, where each x • is an element chosen from {0, 1} n , then after one round type-I GFN encryption, the output is given by (
, where F i is the i-th round function which maps from n bits to n bits.
For illustrations, refer to Figure 1 . For type-I GFN, one can find 5-round equivalent structure, we show this equivalence in Figure 2 , for any choice of x ∈ F n 2 , the encryption will receive the same result. Hence for an r-round (r ≥ 5) type-I GFN, we can fix one entry of the last (or the first) r −5 round functions arbitrarily. In the rest of this paper, we will use these equivalent relationships by default.
Brief Introduction on Yoyo Game
The yoyo game was firstly introduced by Biham et al. in attacking the 16-round Skipjack [2] . In this game, whenever we start with a pair of plaintexts which satisfies the property, all the resultant pairs of encryptions must also satisfy the property, otherwise if we start with a pair of plaintexts which does not satisfy the property, the resultant encryptions will terminate in a few steps. This game can be used as a distinguisher, deciding whether an unknown encryption algorithm is the target structure or not. In [4] , Biryukov et al. developed a structural attack based on this cryptanalysis and provided the theoretical framework for this game in attacking 5-round FN.
In this paper, inspired by the work of Biryukov et al, we propose a way to recover type-I GFN on the basis of the yoyo game attack by [2] and [4] . We roughly conclude the sketch of the original yoyo game by the following procedures:
1) Find a 1-probability truncated differential → δ. If a pair of plaintexts (ciphertexts, resp.) (P 0 , P 0 ) ((C 0 , C 0 ), resp.) satisfies the restriction of the truncated VOLUME 7, 2019 differential, these two plaintexts (ciphertexts, resp.) are referred to as plaintext-connected [4] (ciphertextconnected, resp.). 2) Construct a special transformation φ acting on the plaintext pair (P, P ), which keeps the plaintextconnection property, i.e., if (P, P ) are connected, then φ(P, P ) keep the property of connection. 3) Construct a special transformation ψ acting on the ciphertext pair (C, C ), which keeps the ciphertextconnection property, i.e., if (C, C ) are connected, then ψ(C, C ) keep the property of connection. 4) Start from a plaintext-connected pair (P 0 , P 0 ), then encrypt this pair to (C 0 , C 0 ). We act the mapping ψ on (C 0 , C 0 ), receiving a new ciphertext pair (
, then act the mapping φ on (P 1 , P 1 ) again and get a new pair (P 2 , P 2 ). Repeat this process and collect enough pairs. 5) For each step of this game, we can build equations for the first several rounds by taking use of the relationship between the plaintext pair (P • , P • ) and the difference property. Similarly, we can build equations for the last several rounds. When plenty of equations are achieved, we can use a SAT solver to get the look-up table of the outermost rounds.
III. YOYO GAME PROPERTY OF 10-ROUND TYPE-I GFNs
In this section we develop the yoyo game property of our target structure. Consider a pair of plaintexts P = (p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , p 4 ) and P = (p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , p 4 ) such that the input difference of the 5-th round function F 5 is equal to 0 and that of the 6-th round function F 6 is equal to γ (γ = 0). Then the input difference of F 2 is equal to γ . From the decryption direction, we also declare that the input difference of the 2-nd branches in the 8-th and the 9-th round are respectively equal to 0 and γ (see Figure 3 ). Definition 1: If the encryptions of a plaintext pair (P, P ) follow the differential trail in Figure 3 , then they are said to be plaintext-γ -connected, if the decryptions of a ciphertext pair (C, C ) follow the differential trail in Figure 3 , then they are said to be ciphertext-γ -connected.
Clearly, by this definition, if a plaintext pair (P, P ) is γ -connected, then (E(P), E(P )) is also γ -connected, and vise versa.
Take the differential trail of Figure 3 into consideration, an equivalent description of a plaintext-γ -connected pair (P, P ) can be rewritten by the next equations. then the second equation of the plaintext equation can be rewritten as
Plaintext Equations
Since this equation system provides an equivalent description of connected pair, we conclude that if a plaintext pair
, which matches these two equations. By this way, (P 1 , P 1 ) is also a plaintext-γ -connected pair. This property is summarized as follows. Property 1. We define a mapping φ γ by
If the plaintext pair (P, P ) of 10-round type-I GFN is plaintext-γ -connected, then φ γ (P, P ) is also a plaintext-γ -connected pair. At the same time, the equivalent description of a ciphertext-γ -connected pair (C, C ) can also be rewritten using the next equations.
Ciphertext Equations
Furthermore, we have noticed an interesting fact that neither these two equations contain c 2 or c 2 , so if two ciphertexts C 0 = (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 ) and C 0 = (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 ) are ciphertext-γ -connected, then for any A, B ∈ {0, 1} n , C 1 = (c 1 , A, c 3 , c 4 ) and C 1 = (c 1 , B, c 3 , c 4 ) are also ciphertext-γ -connected.
By taking further look into these ciphertext equations, we conclude the following property.
Property 2: Let h, g and f A,B be three mappings, respectively defined by h [(c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 ), (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 c 2 , c 3 , c 4 ), (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 )],  g[(c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 ), (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 c 2 , c 3 , c 4 ), (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 
IV. PEEL OFF THE OUTER ROUNDS
In order to fulfill the structural attack against 10-round type-I GFN, we will initially peel off the first and the last three rounds by taking advantage of the yoyo game property. In this section, we will focus on reducing the complexity of the yoyo game attack.
A. ORIGINAL YOYO GAME ATTACK AGAINST 10-ROUND TYPE-I GFN
The basic idea of this attack may refer to Figure 4 . If we get a plaintext-γ -connected pair (P 0 , P 0 ) of 10-round type-I GFN, we can generate a large number of γ -connected pairs, and use these pairs to collect equations for F 1 , F 8 and F 9 .
We encrypt this pair and get the ciphertext pair (C 0 , C 0 ). Recall the definition in Property 2, for each choice of A, B ∈ {0, 1} n , we act the mapping f A,B on the ciphertext pair (C 0 , C 0 ), and get a set 1 consisting of ciphertext pairs which are ciphertext-γ -connected, i.e. 1 = {f A,B (C 0 , C 0 ) : A, B ∈ {0, 1} n }. Later we act the mapping g and then h on 1 and obtain two new sets 2 = {g(x, y) : (x, y) ∈ 1 } and 3 = {h(x, y) : (x, y) ∈ 2 }. Employing the results of Property 2, the elements in 2 and 3 are ciphertext-γ -connected. Since (A, B) pair has 2 2n choices, we conclude # 1 = # 2 = # 3 = 2 2n . (An interesting fact is, for any pairs in these three sets, the 3-rd and 4-th components always keep the same. For this reason, these pairs contribute only one single equation related to F 8 /F 9 .)
We decrypt the set • and get three plaintext pair sets
. In these three • , there are 3 × 2 2n random-looking plaintext pairs which are γ -connected, among all probabilities, we can find enough plaintext equations for F 1 .
The next target rounds are F 8 and F 9 . We operate the function φ γ on sets 1 , 2 and 3 , then we get γ -connected ciphertext pair sets 1 , 2 and 3 . Further, we encrypt all the plaintext pairs in these three sets and get three new sets of ciphertext pairs, i.e. 1 , 2 and 3 . In this case, the 3-rd and the 4-th components of the ciphertext pairs in these sets seem like random. Then we use them to get equations for F 8 and F 9 .
B. IMPROVE THE ORIGINAL YOYO GAME
The basic precondition for the original attack is that (P 0 , P 0 ) is a connected pair. If (P 0 , P 0 ) are not connected, the equations of F 1 , F 8 and F 9 will end up requiring contradictory entries, e.g. F 1 (0) = 0 and F 1 (0) = 1. In this case, the pair (P 0 , P 0 ) must be discarded.
We can also start the yoyo game from a pair of connected ciphertexts, in the original attack, we need about 2 4n × 2 4n ≈ 2 8n memory space to store the information about whether all the plaintext/ciphertext pairs are visited or not, and for each pair, the SAT solver needs about O(2 2n×2.73 ) steps to find a solution or report failure (The time complexity is dominated by solving the system of linear equations with Gaussian elimination, whose time complexity is 2 2.73×2n steps with Strassen's Algorithm, so the time complexity of the this attack is about O (2 2.73×2n ) ).
The main cost in the original attack includes two essentials: 1. storing whether all pairs were visited or not, and 2. computation cost by SAT solver. Next we focus on reducing the memory and simplify the computation. Our improvement starts from the following two observations. c 2 , c 3 , c 4 ), (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ,  c 4 ) ] be a pair of ciphertexts, then the representative ciphertext-pair of (C, C ) is defined by 0, c 3 , c 4 ), (c 1 , 0, c 3 , c 4 ) ].
Theoretical Observation
(2) Let (C, C ) 0 = [(c 1 , 0, c 3 , c 4 ), (c 1 , 0, c 3 , c 4 ) ] be a representative ciphertext-pair, then the extension set of (C, C ) 0 is defined by (c 1 , x, c 3 , c 4 ), (c 1 , y, c 3 , c 4 ) ] : x, y ∈ {0, 1} n }.
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Theorem 1: Let S ≺ (C, C ) 0 be the extension set of (C, C ) 0 , then if there exists a disconnected pair of ciphertexts in the set S ≺ (C, C ) 0 , then all the entries in the set are disconnected.
Proof: 0, c 3 , c 4 ) ], and we assume that the ciphertext-pair [(c 1 , x 0 , c 3 , c 4 ), (c 1 , y 0 ,  c 3 , c 4 ) ] are disconnected. If there exist a, b ∈ {0, 1} n , such that [ (c 1 , a, c 3 , c 4 ), (c 1 , b, c 3 , c 4 ) ] are connected, then by Property 2, any pair in the set S ≺ (C, C ) 0 is connected, which contradicts our assumption.
Q.E.D.
By Theorem 1, if we have already discarded (C, C ) 0 , and all the pairs in S ≺ (C, C ) 0 should also be discarded, then we can use (C, C ) 0 as a representative element of set S ≺ (C, C ) 0 . This property is quite advantageous to the attack, since we only need to choose the start point from the representative pair set
Experimental Observation
Recall the yoyo game distinguisher, for any γ fixed in advance, the probability of a random pair satisfies ciphertext-γ -connected is about 1/2 2n , which means in about 2 2n pairs, we may find one ciphertext-γ -connected pair.
For any fixed c * 3 , c * 4 , we consider the ciphertext set {(x, 0, c * 3 , c * 4 ) : x ∈ {0, 1} n } and construct about 2 2n ciphertext pairs from this set. Starting from these pairs and play the yoyo game, for any fixed γ value, we are able to find one γ -connected pair on average after exhausting the 2 2n pairs. This proposition is supported by experiment on small-scale structures.
Based on the observations above, we perform an improved attack to recover the outer rounds. Our improved process can be divided into two phases, the judging phase and the recovering phase, the general view may refer to Figure 5 .
Judging Phase
In the first place, we randomly choose c * 3 , c * 4 , γ ∈ {0, 1} n , then store the LUT of the ciphertext set CS := {(x, 0, c * 3 , c * 4 ) : x ∈ {0, 1} n }, using this LUT, we may FIGURE 5. Improved yoyo game attack against 10-round type-I GFN.
construct a pool consisting of ciphertext pairs, i.e.
] in the pool, we:
1. Get
by visiting the LUT of CS. 2. For each choice of A, B ∈ {0, 1} n , we compute D • f A,B (C 1 , C 1 ) and add a new equation (which is related to F 1 ) to the SAT solver. In this step, legal guess of (α 0 , β 0 ) will bypass the SAT solver all the time, in this case we can finally get the LUT of F 1 and a connected ciphertext pair (C 1 , C 1 ). Yet for illegal guess, using the birthday paradox, the SAT solver will report failure after adding about 2 n/2 equations to the SAT solver, at this time, we start a new guess of (α 0 , β 0 ).
In this phase, we use a random selected γ rather than guess its value. By the experimental observation, we can find one γ -connected-pair on average. The memory is about O(2 n ), mainly in storing the LUT of CS. The computation cost in this phase can be divided into two parts.
1. For each wrong pair, the computation is for the SAT solver to discard the wrong guess (we roughly estimate this consumption by the complexity of Strassen's Algorithm), which is calculated by (2 2n − 1) × 2 2.73× n 2 2 3.36n . 2. For the right pair, the computation is calculated by 2 2.73n , which is used by the SAT solver for calculating the LUT.
Recovering Phase
We have already get a γ -connected-pair (C 1 , C 1 ) and the LUT of F 1 . In this phase, we will concentrate on recovering F 8 and F 9 .
We construct the following sets step by step:
}; We considering the set 1 , in which all the ciphertext pairs are connected, from each pair, we build two equations respectively related to F 8 and F 9 , since # 1 = 2 n , we may collect 2 n equations for each of these two mappings, then by employing the SAT solver, we can recover the LUTs of F 8 and F 9 . In very extreme cases where we do not have enough equations, we continue this game and collect more pairs and finally get more equations (see Figure 5 ).
This phase requires about 2 n memory to store the set 1 , and 2 2.73n+1 steps to calculate the LUTs of F 8 and F 9 .
In short, the attack against F 1 , F 8 and F 9 requires about O(2 n ) storage and O(2 3.36n ) time complexity, compared with the original yoyo game attack, this modified attack can greatly reduce the complexity.
V. DECOMPOSE THE REST ROUNDS
So far we have already recovered F 1 , F 8 and F 9 , then we repeat our attack from the reverse direction, similarly we can recover F 2 , F 3 and F 10 , at this time we are left with 4 round functions, i.e. F 4 , F 5 , F 6 and F 7 , the encryption structure may refer to Figure 6 .
The encryption structure gives the following equations Since all the other outer round functions have already been peeled off, by taking the equations above, we can freely choose the input value and visit the output, or choose the output then visit the input. Any way, we can get the LUTs of F 4 , F 5 , F 6 and F 7 respectively, with time complexity about 4 × 2 n .
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a new generic attack against type-I GFN capable of recovering all the details in this structure. We have improved the yoyo game proposed by [2] and [4] . In our improved game, one rejects a large group of start guesses by a single wrong guess, which will greatly help in reducing the complexity. The results allow us to find the LUTs of the first-three and last-three round functions. Later, the rest rounds are recovered by using the encryption relations. In general, the complete recovery requires time complexity O(2 3.36n ) and memory O(2 n ).
Our results can be treated as a security measurement of generalized Feistel family ciphers, which will even approximate a real-life attack against 64-bit block cipher. We believe that the structural recovery in this paper is caused by the sparsity of the encryption architecture. Decomposing a 10-round type-I GFN costs less than decomposing a 5-round FN, therefore, from the viewpoint of structural attack, the architecture of the 10-round type-I GFN may not be as strong as that of the 5-round FN.
